Le Scarabée
Masquer la pub

[Kosovo] En route to Beograd

par Eric Cotte
mise en ligne : 20 April 1999
 

With "reversals in the con­flict", "new steps", and "addi­tional measures", NATO is paving the way for a buildup towards a good big war… probably to avoid a nasty small peace.

I must admit that, at first, I took NATO people for a bunch of incom­petent idiots. It’s logical: NATO is a mil­itary organ­iz­ation and, as such, not much can be expected from it besides launching mis­siles while making stupid comments.

Hence, sheep­ishly, when the strategy gurus of the Atlantic alliance explained that they hadn’t foreseen the Serb res­istance, the intens­i­fic­ation of ethnic cleansing and the human cata­strophe, I believed them: they’re in the mil­itary, thus they’re dumb and it’s normal that they didn’t see any­thing coming.

But, thinking a little, I decided that it was too easy a way out. Sorry if I’m repeating myself, but everyone knows that a war is long and tough, and that retali­ating on civilians is the weapon of choice of tyrants. Everyone knows that wars are accom­panied by human­it­arian problems (civilians fleeing combat zones and super­markets closing down). Everyone knows it… so NATO had to know.

Why, then, this lie and self-​​beating?

NATO is applying one of the oldest methods of mil­itary pro­pa­ganda: the buildup. It stems from the fact that people hate to throw them­selves in a war from one day to the next. If one wants a good big war, one has to con­vince demo­cracies. And the most effi­cient method is to make baby steps, to mul­tiply the pro­voca­tions, the slips and insults. Making people face facts allows to harden the dis­course and to lead public opinion by the nose.

Each step obeys a classic scheme.

1. A reminder of the "objectives of the war", and deployment of a set-​​up insuf­fi­cient to meet them.

2. The enemy replies through verbal pro­voca­tions, and an aug­ment­ation of mil­itary actions. At best, he cap­tures and kills a few sol­diers (or coun­selors, inspectors, or blue helmets) and takes a few civilians hostage.

3. Com­mu­nic­ation cam­paigns denouncing the enemy’s pro­pa­ganda, its mil­itary buildup, and the human­it­arian problem taking place.

4. Hard facts: "it’s tougher than we thought", apo­lo­gizes the mil­itary. Since people hate losing a war, they them­selves ask for addi­tional efforts.

5. As a reaction, the number of sol­diers involved increases. Sim­ul­tan­eously, the "war objectives" are redefined (upped) in such manner that the mil­itary setup is still not sufficient.

It all works very well: it’s thanks to this system that demo­cracies got involved in wars lost in advance, fol­lowing "sound" mil­itary advice. If the enemy happened to be too meek, pro­voking slips that we attribute to him, or propagating false news, could do the trick.

Back to the con­flict in Yugoslavia. The first day saw only a few hours worth of night strikes, to force Milo­sevic to come back and nego­tiate in Ram­bouillet. Of course, it failed: raiding cities is a show of force that never lead any­where. Serbian answer: pro­pa­ganda based on archaic reli­gious and ethnic arguments.

Hence, the air strikes intensify, and the objectives become: "defending our values" (European values in Europe, American values in the US). Defending values using stealth fighters doesn’t work, no doubt… Serbian answer: intens­i­fic­ation of the ethnic cleansing.

Re-​​intensification of the strikes, adding non-​​military targets located in the city center. New objectives: defending people from Kosovo. Another failure. Serbian answer: three American taken prisoner.

"Pris­oners" implies "reversal in the con­flict" (it doesn’t take more for the mil­itary). Air strikes are intens­ified and attack heli­copters are deployed (whose goal isn’t strikes… what is it then?). New objective: pre­venting Milo­sevic, dubbed the new Hitler responsible for 300,000 deaths, from doing any more harm (we’re now straying somewhat far from the initial objectives: evoking Ram­bouillet becomes ana­chron­istic when facing the Balkan Hilter). Serbian answer: Kosovo’s borders are mined and a few incur­sions into Albania are made (to be con­firmed, but the fact is that we heard some­thing about it).

Air strikes are now con­ducted 24 hours a day, "human­it­arian" troupes (nice oxy­moron, by the way) are deployed along the borders of Kosovo, and polls are con­ducted on the subject of ground inter­vention. Reserve sol­diers are called…

What will be the next steps? We’re moving towards per­manent strikes aimed at more and more civilian targets, perhaps the bombing of Beograd ("Phase 3" of NATO’s plan), and ground occu­pation of Kosovo. New Serbian pro­voca­tions (real or ima­ginary) will be needed to justify new steps. Here are a few ideas: "Milo­sevic has some moles inside NATO", "Milo­sevic menaces to re-​​annex Montenegro", "Milo­sevic is trying to bring the whole Balkans into a war (then Russia and Greece, and we’re going towards a third World War)", "Milo­sevic has nuclear weapons", "Milo­sevic gets head from an intern"… As many good reasons as we need to rein­force our setup and to "put them under pressure". We can already hear "until the end" and "by all means necessary".

Step by step, mil­itary pro­pa­ganda is making up and con­trolling this buildup. It is aimed at making people ask, on their own, for more force, more deploy­ments and ground inter­ven­tions. At the same time, initial objectives are being redefined and becoming tougher and tougher, so that halting the hos­til­ities would look like a "bad peace".

We’re going towards war, pro­gress­ively, each step becoming a no-​​turning-​​back point.

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